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Some Thoughts on Chinese Stock Market –
Based on its disconnection with real economy 
in contrast to real estate market
The discussion starts from the fact of the extremely low correlation between the performan-
ce of Chinese stock market and the real economy. The author aims to exhibit a relatively 
comprehensive view of Chinese stock market (as well as the related economic factors) and 
analyzed the causing factors for the low correlation from different angels. Besides the tests 
which signify the low correlation of stock market to real economy (with real estate being the 
contrasting group), mainly qualitative methods are adopted in analyzing and explaining the 
results of low correlation from different perspectives. The conclusion is that stock market is 
not the optimal option for driving Chinese capital market, and policy suggestions are also 
given in this paper.
1. Introduction / Background
1.1 Overview
The first stock exchange of China is going to celebrate its 29th anniversary this year. Chinese 
stock market came into being amid the wave of reforms, and develops along with the evolvement 
of the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. At the end of year 2015, its market 
capitalization reached 8892 billion USD○,1 (12% of the global total) (China Securities Deposito-
ry and Clearing Corporation Limited, 2016), and number of investors reached 99 million (7% of 
national total) (China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, 2016), but the 
correlation  between stock index and GDP (detailed in part 2) is significantly lower than other 
economies, while in contrast the real estate sector has especially high correlation with the eco-
nomy. This paper is going to analyze this detachment between stock market and real economy 
by looking into the history (part 3) and current situation (part 4), discuss the unlikeliness of a 
fundamental improvement in foreseeable future (part 5), propose alternatives based on Chinese 
characteristics (part 6), and conclude that stock market is not the best option to enhance capital 
market for China (part 7). In this article China refers to mainland China. Hong Kong and Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange are excluded.
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1.2 Terminologies
IPO (Initial Public Offering)
IPO refers to the company’s first offer of stocks to the general public. It’s the primary sale and 
happens upon the company gets listed on the stock exchange, which differentiates itself from sale 
of stocks on secondary market. (The Economic Times, 2019)
Registration-based IPO system
IPO registration system refers to the registration process wherein the issuer fully disclose and 
accurately report to securities regulators, then securities regulators will verify the comprehensi-
veness and reliability of document, without the issuer's qualification for substantive reviews and 
value judgments (Y. Xie, 2016)
Approval-based IPO system
Different from registration-based system where the crucial decisions are left to the market, 
under the approval-based system, only the companies which has received the explicit “go ahead” 
from regulators can float shares (Financial Times, 2013)
Two-tier pricing system. 
In 1984, Chinese government proposed the two-tier pricing system, which aims to assist 
smooth transition from planned economy to market economy. Under this system, the goods are 
priced differently according to its channel of distribution (state or private) (21-century Econo-
mic Reports, 2014)
B-shares 
Under the regulation of Chinese Stock Exchange, B-share is a special category of shares lis-
ted on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, which are purchased via foreign currencies by 
foreign investors. After 2001, Eligible Chinese citizens can also trade in B-shares with foreign 
currencies. (China Securities Regulation Committee, 2006)
2. Statistic test on the stock market’s relationship to real 
economy (real-estate sector serves as a contrasting group)
2.1 Design of the statistic tests
2.1.1 Selection of proxies
Proxy for stock market – CSI800: Published by CSIO (China Securities Index Corporation 
Limited), CSI800 is so far the most comprehensive index of Chinese stock market with sufficient 
historical data, starting from year 2007. Details below.
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Proxy for real estate –100-City Housing Index: Published by China Index Institute, the 100-
City Housing Index (百城价格指数) is the major and reliable reflection of Chinese real estate 
market. Details below.
Proxy for Economy – GDP: official data, not much elaboration as everybody is familiar with 
GDP. Details below.
2.1.2 Time period
Year 2010 -  year 2018
This near-one-decade time saw the significant growth of both stock market and economy, 
while with sound data availability. 
2.1.3 Methodologies.
Firstly the correlation coefficient is calculated and tested, then the linear-regression tech-
niques are employed to further analyze the relationships, in the end the less relevant variab-
le (stock exchange index) is removed to test if the module’s explanatory power increases after 
excluding the less relevant variable or not. 
2.2 Statistic tests
2.2.1 Raw data
Independent Variable Dependent Variables
Time GDP Stock market Real estate
Year GDP (billion RMB) CSI800 100-City Housing Index
2010 41303 3444 9314
2011 48930 2501 9712
2012 54036 2646 9715
2013 59524 2589 10833
2014 64397 3839 10542
2015 68905 4412 10980
2016 74413 3826 13035
2017 82712 4465 13967
2018 90031 3201 14678
From left to right:
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019)
(Census and Economic Information Center, 2019)
(China Index Academy, 2019)
2.2.2 Preliminary processing – correlation?
Calculation of correlation 
Correlation coefficient {GDP, Stock Market} = 0.4959 
Correlation coefficient {GDP, Real estate} = 0.9559
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Summary:
The above shows a weak positive correlation between GDP and Stock Market, and a strong 
positive correlation between GDP and Real estate. 
However, for safety, we firstly include both variables in the regression in the next chapter.
2.2.3 First multiple linear regression
Regress both X1 and X2 
Y(t) = GDP(t), X1(t) = CSI800(t), X2(t) = 100-City Housing Index(t)
Result: Y = 2.23487X1 + 7.30474X2 - 26178.81497
Analysis:
A unit change of X2 (housing price), causes about 7-times change of GDP. While a unit 
change of X1 (stock market index), causes about 2-times change of GDP. And in line with the 
correlation analysis, the direction of both changes are positive. 
When both X1 and X2 are zero, there is negative GDP. However in practice they (especially) 
X2 can not be zero. So this abnormality should be ignored. 
Regression table is shown as follows:
Coefficient SE t-stat p-value
b -26178.815 11290.3165 -2.3187 0.05956
X1 2.2349 2.623 0.852 0.4269
X2 7.3047 1.0056 7.2644 0.0003461
The t-statistic for the coefficient of X2 is 0.852 and the p-value is 0.4269, which is way more 
above the 0.05 threshold under 95% confidence level. Thus, we fail to reject H0 (Coefficient X1 
= 0), thus the coefficient for X1 is not significantly different from 0, thus X1 is not significantly 
related with the value of Y. 
Thus we should remove X1, to get a better-fit model, which is shown in the next chapter.
2.2.4 Linear Regression after removing X1
Regress on only X2:
Y(t) = GDP(t), X2(t) = 100-City Housing Index(t)
Result: Y = -22682.5925 + 7.6710 X2
Analysis:
The removal of X1 didn’t significantly change the slope coefficient of X2, which shows the 
excluded variable, X1, was indeed insignificant.
Regression table is shown as follows:
Coeff SE t-stat p-value
b -22682.5925 10310.3106 -2.2 0.06373
X2 7.671 0.8911 8.6088 0.0000569
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The T-statistic for the slope coefficient of X2 is way above the critical value (the p-value is 
way below 0.05). Thus the slope coefficient of X2 is significantly different from 0, thus X2 is a 
significant contributor in determining the value of Y.
Actually under 95% confidence level, the lower t is 5.5640 and the higher t is 9.7780, so the 
absolute value of the slope coefficient of X2 is at least 5.5640. Which says, a unit change in X2 
causes at least more-than-5-times change in the value of Y. 
Regarding the intersection (b), although we fail to reject H0 (b = 0) under 95% confidence 
level as the p-value is larger than 0.05, in the author’s opinion the b shouldn't be removed due to 
economic rationale and what's more, the p-value is only slightly larger than 0.05.
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Statistic P-value
Regression 1 1840562261 1840562261 74.1107 0.0000569
Residual 7 173847095 24835299.28
Total 8 2014409356 251801169.4
R square =0.9137
Adjusted R square =0.9014
Both R square and adjusted R square indicates strong explanatory power. 
2.2.5 Conclusion of the statistic tests
There is insignificant positive correlation between GDP and Stock Market.
There is significant positive correlation between GDP and Real estate, and the relationship is:
GDP = -22682.5925 + 7.6710 * 100-City Housing Index
We can be more than 99% sure that a unit change in 100-City Housing Index will cause at 
least more-than-5-times increase in GDP.
Thus Chinese economy is driven more than real estate, than the stock market (or stock mar-
ket is detached from Chinese economy). 
The following parts aims to give a relatively comprehensive view on and find explanations for 
the abnormally insignificant relevance of stock exchange to real economy in China. 
3. History of Chinese stock market 
Thanks to the brave economists and adventurous leadership, the idea "stock" was put into practice. 
After transforming state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies, the first stock exchange was 
set up. Analogous to its two-tier price system, the stock market was also a mixed product. It had all 
features of contemporary stock exchange, while bearing characters of socialist economy — state-ow-
ned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the market, investors are encouraged to participate to assist SOEs in 
transformation or getting over financial difficulties (by which investors absorb SOE’s onerous assets at 
above-market prices), same shares can be entitled with different right or price when under different 
categorization as shares are categorized by state shares which are held by state and banned from tra-
ding, legal person shares which are owned by institutions with legal person status and restricted from 
trading, individual shares which are issued to public and traded domestically, and B-shares which are 
issued to and traded by foreign investors. Though this method does not make sense today, it harvested 
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positive market reaction at the beginning — SOEs found way of financing, government managed to 
keep the economy running, investors benefited from capital gain as share prices were booming during 
the initial stage of stock market.  From a size of 8 listed companies to today’s scale, Chinese stock 
market underwent numerous landmark events. The significance increased, the system is modernized, 
but the true picture of Chinese stock market is far more than any simple definition could describe. As 
mentioned in the beginning, the categorizations above are historical products when the government 
tried to smoothly transit the system. State shares and legal person shares had long been the controlling 
interest (X, Ji. 2014). There were several attempts to address this problem, however they were never 
fully solved due to various concerns until the thorough reform recently. At the end of year 2015, restri-
cted shares only account for 12% and non – tradable shares account for 0.009% of total stocks in issue 
based on face value (China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, 2016).
4. Current situation of Chinese stock market
4.1 Does not serve the firms where capital is most needed and would be 
best utilized
Industries with excess capacity have inappropriately large presence. Among the 3 thousand firms 
listed on A-share market, 72 are nonferrous metal makers, 61 are steel plants, and 41 are coal mines 
(China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, 2016). There is no essential delisting 
mechanism and the spaces for IPO are largely undersupplied, so in most cases they stay listed and take 
away the resource which otherwise would be channeled to new companies. This imbalanced situation 
prolongs the longevity of zombie companies and ads to the barrier for economic restructuring.
99% of Chinese enterprises are Small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They contribute 
the most dynamism to the economy, but they face hard financing. Credit system is not developed in 
China, while SMEs could hardly provide enough collateral to guarantee a loan from banks. Equity-
based crowd funding is under tight control, that any unauthorized funding activity which results in 
more than 200 shareholders is illegal (F, Huang. 2019). Listing requirements (regardless of panels) are 
far too high for most SMEs, even qualified large corporations have to wait in line for an IPO, therefore 
stock market is out of consideration for SMEs. Money either goes to large corporations which easily 
get loans from bank, or piles up in capital feast, but never arrives to SMEs (J. Han, 2010).
4.2 The ambiguous role of government
At this stage, Chinese Government is more than a system maintainer. It never intends to be a mere 
maintainer though. Government wishes to stimulate the economy with sufficient control by policy 
tools, but investors should also be blamed for this policy-driven market. Investors hold the opinion 
that government is supposed to endorse the stock market — they (government) encourage us to par-
ticipate, thus they should guarantee the safety, if not profitability, of stocks. In their philosophy, bull 
market is the result of wise economic policy and bear market is caused by failed governance. 
In the 2015 stock market crash, government kept “rescuing” the market. It announced po-
sitive news almost daily to boost public confidence, ingected altogether 1500 billion RMB (235 
billion USD) to prop up prices, banned sales by large shareholders. Short selling was also prohi-
bited, which was considered to be “malicious” (Chinese Security Report, 2015). 
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Eventually share prices didn’t stop plummeting. However investors got a little comfort to see 
government’s efforts in protecting their assets. Perpetrators were punished —  someone went to prison 
taking responsiblity for the crash, and foreign hedge funds (assets managed by them altogether ac-
count for 1% of total market value) are accused of distorting the market (Y.W, W.J.L, and Z.Q.W, 2017).
4.3 IPO = cash bonanza
Due to the high threshold for listing and restriction on IPO price (by this method govern-
ment attempts to curb what it calls “3 highs”: high IPO price, high P/E ratio, higher-than-nee-
ded raising). The restriction artificially leaves a gap between IPO price and price on secondary 
market, which to a certain extent guaranteed the profit for any successful IPO bidding (L, Chen, 
2018). The rule of IPO fortune is deeply rooted in investors’ minds. Investors have to compete for 
the offering, like how car owners compete for a license plate.
Even the initial public offering price is substantially lower than its market value, the price 
is still significantly higher than its worth in terms of value investment. This is true for any IPO, 
regardless of the company’s actual financial situation or profitability. Investors wouldn’t look 
into those technical indicators either. Everybody rushes in. As aforementioned, the threshold for 
listing is too high. Thus the shell resources of listed companies become valuable. Firms engage 
in hype and financial fraud under undue incentive for getting listed. In this IPO game, both the 
original shareholders and lucky bidders win, and pass on the overvalued share price.
4.4 Irrational investment logic
Speculation dominates. Turnover rate surpasses 200% in bleak time, and exceeds 600% during 
vigorous period, while the turnover rates internationally are below 100% (Sinafinance, 2019). Chi-
nese individual investors generally have no or low level of professional knowledge. It’s no exaggera-
tion to say that some even don’t really know what stock is. They cheer for a rise and sorrow for a fall. 
What comes after unprofessionalism is the prevalence of rumors. All kinds of announcements 
from any listed company, tips from fortune-telling “experts”, any interpretation of words from regu-
lator, and new conceptualization of anything, work on investors. Investors rely on those to make a 
bet, regardless of the authenticity and commercial implication of the information. One kind of po-
pular view held by investors is “2RMB-per-share shares are cheaper than 20RMB-per-share shares”. 
They don’t look at the P/E ratio or the value of underlying assets or business, instead they compare 
the quotes of shares issued by different companies like picking cabbage in market hall. Ironically, 
this logic works — when lots of believers buy it, they actually perk up the price of 2-RMB shares. 
4.5 Extreme imbalanced positions of institutional investors and indi-
vidual investors
At the end of year 2015, there are 98.8 million individual investors out of 99.1 million total inves-
tors (China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, 2016). Natural persons account 
for around 99% of total investors, while around 90% of individual investors loss, and the average 
loss per person is around 100 thousand RMB (Oriental Wealth, 2018). However, the annual average 
income in 2015 is only 21966 RMB (1 RMB = 0.14 USD) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016).
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The reason is simple, Individual investor to institutional investor on stock market is what 
bettor to bookmaker in casino. Institutional investors carry out those schemes again and again, 
and there are always new gamblers wishing to join in.  
Stock market itself does not earn or evaporate a single penny. During the 29 years of Chinese 
stock market’s history, the biggest winners are state-owned enterprises which took away 500 
billion RMB (72.5 billion USD) from individual investors during year 1998 to year 2000 (Sohu 
News, 2015). The funds enabled their upgrading programs, or went to the pockets of the ma-
nagement. Other winners are original shareholders of listed firms who make a fortune through 
IPO, professional investors who profit from information asymmetry and institutional manipu-
lation, and government which collects stamp tax and gets relieved from the financial burden to 
transform state-owned enterprises.
5. The unlikeliness of a fundamental improvement
It’s not difficult to tell that current stock market in China does not live up to its expected 
economic function. China is currently using approval system for IPO, and a transition from 
approval system to registration system has been viewed as a fundamental change by Chinese 
people (X. C, 2013). Official consent for transition finally came at the end of year 2015. The 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress authorized relevant bodies to implement 
registration system. This decision shall take effect on March 1st 2016, and is valid for 2 years. But 
Gang Xiao, the former head of China Securities Regulatory Commission, was suddenly removed 
from office 9 days before the due date. Since then the reform was never mentioned again in the 
annual government reports for year 2016 and year 2017 (M.Y Li, 2017). Registration system did 
not come before the 2-year period expires, it’s not expected to materialize in near future either. 
The mature registration system in developed countries represents advanced market, so the dis-
cussion on the unlikeliness of a fundamental improvement will center on registration system and 
the implication of Chinese characteristics to any reform.
5.1 Obstacles for reforming
5.1.1 Stability is of overriding importance
Stability is the prior concern for Chinese government. Fond of it or not, Stability did contribute to 
Chinese rapid economic development and count as one remarkable achievement of the governance. 
Chinese government controls banks, thus controls the economy. The net assets of Chinese 
banks (more than 260 trillion RMB) (State Ministry, 2019) is about 3 times market value of stock 
market (58 trillion RMB. CSI800 closed at 3839 on the day of measurement). Bank is bound up 
with every sector and individual, while stock market has limited reach. Besides the distance in 
capital, stock pledge activities are under careful watch especially after the crash in 2015. So the 
potential danger is controllable .
Though currently stock market is not large enough to wreck the economy, its significance can 
not be ignored. Tens of millions of ordinary families put substantial amount of their wealth on 
stocks. When they watch the value halve within few days or weeks, government has to face the 
angry crowd (2015 stock market crash). Though government shouldn’t be directly blamed for 
incidents in the game of chance.
Would government suddenly open up the stock market and devolve power? Not likely.
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5.1.2 Inability of regulation
A free and fair market is guarded by a strong regulation system. It’s not likely to come true in 
China in foreseeable future. Regulation system is made up of law, agencies which enforce the law, 
and objects (people) who are restricted by the law. All three are problematic in China. To start with, 
a reform of stock market requires a transformation of legislation. The laws should cover all rela-
tive areas and emergent issues as a result of new system, without omission, duplication, conflicts, 
and more importantly, unreasonableness under market economy condition. This is a huge project 
involving all parties which would in essence break the existing paradigm. But any change in peace-
time China is experimental, sectional, and controllable, delivered by negotiations between inte-
rested groups. Enforcement agencies are also essential. Regardless of theoretical design, it’s people 
who finalize the execution. Currently the judiciary departments, or authorities on all level have too 
much discretionary power — bestowed upon people in power. Actually, the capacity of agencies is 
not enough to put into practice in every case the rule of law — like the current status of tax collecti-
on. And, based on the inadequacy of many laws, complete execution would disable the functioning 
of economy — again like what’s happening in tax administration. Lastly, Chinese special survival 
skills, special governance philosophy, and special savoir-faire have made Chinese enterprise have, 
and must have excellent ability in working around the edges. The “rule by man” instead of “rule by 
law” has been the truth for China for thousands of years, it is impossible to be reversed overnight. 
5.1.3 Obstacle from vested interest groups 
The leadership of regulator, the executives of SOEs, the super – rich who have intricate con-
nection to capital market, and the hedge funds who benefit from information asymmetry would 
try to maintain the status quo. They control the most resources in regulatory departments. They 
interconnect with each other and form a group which is beyond lower classes’ reach. 
5.1.4 Anti-monopolization
“The world history was completely established when capitalism came into monopolization 
phase” — German Ideology, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
China, as a socialist country, holds the philosophy that the nature of governance is good, 
and the nature of capital is evil. A capital market with large size, easy entrance and high liquidity 
facilitates mergers and acquisitions. The government does not wish to see the dominant power 
of private capital, which is blamed for the turmoil in developed economies. On this ground, Chi-
nese government has good reason to assume a larger role on stock market.
5.2 Factors undermining the effects of possible reform in any form
5.2.1 Misunderstanding of registration system
To start with, there is wide misconception among Chinese people that “IPO registration sy-
stem allows all companies get listed as long as they meet disclosure requirements”. Even in U.S., 
the model of free capital market, companies wishing for an IPO can not bypass substantial revi-
ew. In U.S.’s dual registration system, IPOs are regulated by both SEC (U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission) and by state-level regulatory agencies (X Cai, 2013). The state-level agencies in-
vestigate on companies’ potential value to limit the risk exposure on behalf of investors, like what 
CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) is now doing in its approval system. 
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5.2.2 Lack of Independence of stock exchanges
Stock exchanges would have undue incentive for IPO business when the decision right is 
dissolved to them. Currently the centralized regulatory body does the due diligence work, there 
is rent-seeking. But situation won’t get a lot better when rent-seeking becomes stock exchanges’ 
profit-seeking. Under the drive of commission fee, disqualified companies get listed. Dragons 
and fishes jumble together. Excellent companies are concealed by the flood of all types — if all 
what they need to do for an IPO qualification is disclosure. 
A fettered market is better than a chaotic market. Taking into consideration the immature 
legal system, a freer entrance to stock market would bring more distortion. The “elevated bus” 
craze in 2016 (It is a fund raising scheme devised by a P2P (peer-to-peer lending) firm based on 
an impractical invention which was officially denied 6 years ago. In its idea: A giant double-deck-
bus-like vehicle with hollow ground floor to enable cars pass below would improve efficiency 
and save energy if adopted for public traffic) showed the enthusiasm of Chinese people and their 
lack of common sense (New York Times, 2017). What will be the consequence if the high thres-
holds for IPO are cleared away? Investors will wish to come back to current system.
5.2.3 Issue cost is too high for SMEs
The average issue cost for Chinese companies is around 15 million RMB (1RMB =0.15 USD) 
(Sina Finance, 2018). The expenses are not necessarily higher than the expenses overseas. Ho-
wever, it’s an astronomical figure for ordinary SMEs which expect to make up the cost merely 
by future profit. Not every SMEs is the prototype of Uber or Airbnb. More ever, the cost does 
not include future expenses in meeting regulatory requirements such as audit fee, and hidden 
expenses which can not be put on table. Last but not the least, stringently obeying all the rule 
and regulation would substantially increase the cost for SMEs in many sectors — their existing 
business model may no longer be profitable.
5.2.4 Large gap between ordinary SMEs and future companies entitled for IPO
Similar to the effect of issue cost, only big player can be a member of stock market. The 
distinctions within the SME group are obvious. According to The Law of the People's Republic 
of China on the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, the benchmarks for SMEs 
in terms of annual revenue are: 150 million RMB (22.5 million USD) for retail and catering 
industries, and 300 million RMB (45 million USD) for all other sectors. The benchmarks for 
SMEs in terms of number of employees are 200 for wholesale and retail industries, 800 for cate-
ring industry, and 3000 for construction and transportation industries (Peking University, 2002). 
While the majority of businesses energizing Chinese economy are far below such scale. So it’s 
reasonable to believe that when the listing requirements become more reachable, they are not the 
concern for the majority of SMEs which have the most difficulty in financing. 
6. Better options to enhance capital market
June 20th 2016 is a historical day for Chinese banking industry. Overnight rate reached 30%, 
7-day repo rate reached 28%. Strangely enough, M2 supply was increasing at 11.5% per year, 
reaching 151 trillion RMB (22.65 trillion USD), but producer price index (PPI) stayed at decade 
low (Sinan Finance, 2016). Besides the decrease in the release of reserve resulting from foreign 
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2016/3326 9
exchange income, the major reason is that money circulates within financial institutions back 
and forth but never reaches to real economy — more specifically, the parts of economy which are 
not real estate sector or industries with over capacity. Central bank was determined to curve this 
trend, it refused to lower deposits rate and let commercial banks dissolve the crazy on their own. 
Money supply was enough, debt ratio was high, but they are not channeled to the places where 
funds can be best utilized. The options to enhance capital market will center on improvement in 
banking industry and development of focused, targeted capital markets. 
6.1 Improve the banking sector
Chinese banks already have dominant position in national economy as discussed in 5.1.1, 
however there is huge space for correction and potential to release as discussed in 4.1 and 6.
6.1.1 Credit information system
Technology is highly developed today, and Chinese financial system has been highly digitalized. 
But the credit information system still lags far behind the standards in developed countries. It should 
be solved and it shouldn’t be technically challenging. Currently different credit institution adopt dif-
ferent systems, and the share of information is not satisfactory for confidentiality concern, stability 
concern, or other concerns which block transparency. Real data on bad debt ratio is unavailable, but 
there is reason to believe non – performing loans stand at more than 15% (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, 2017). If a reliable and transparent information system is available, fraud by borrowers 
could be curbed and companies without adequate collateral can get easier access to loans.
6.1.2 Encourage the development of local banks
Put aside the state interests in other type of banks, the “Big 5” state holding banks account 
for 39.1% of total assets of Chinese banking sector (Banking Observer, 2018). Chinese people 
have strong tendency for saving. Savings rate gradually grew to around 50% after 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, savings amount to about half of GDP (M. W. Local commercial banks deal with 
more risky loans and have more expertise in the sub-sectors to which they lend out the money. 
If local banks enjoy more autonomy and have bigger share of the huge savings, together with the 
development of information system, the reach of credit could be much more extended among 
SMEs and the efficiency of funds could be much more enhanced. Currently it's still the case that 
money overly circulates within financial institutions, and similar situation of high overnight rate 
appeared again in 2016 (of smaller scale). There is large potential for improvement.
6.2 Crowd-funding — develop flexible, targeted mechanisms
Crowd-funding is a grey area in China, while recently it shows strong momentum. The suc-
cess of several online platforms backed by renowned electronic commerce companies indicates 
the positive attitudes of both the regulator and the market. Crowd-funding can be creative. Some 
fractionize the equity as thinly as to only 1RMB per share, some offer support for unusual ideas 
which only cater to the minority, some even in essence prepay the innovative producers for the 
products they promise to deliver. How to clear frauds and facilitate mentality for value invest-
ment instead of gambling is the key issue. It’s not realistic to expect for a holistic improvement 
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of stock market pushed by legal force from outside as discussed previously, however, if targeted 
markets categorized by geographic area, sub-industry, or certain group of people are developed, 
the quality of Chinese capital market can be desirable. As Chinese people rely largely on fami-
liarity and connection, focused market could facilitate these resources among targeted groups. 
Information is more symmetrical in an area where all participants are familiar with, decent con-
duction shall be expected as people value reputation in their respective circles, investors invest 
in the projects where they really support, and this relatively transparent market with small par-
ticipation raised the difficulty for speculation and fraud. 
The development of such mechanism depends largely on the approval of local government 
officials, the attitude of their superiors, the resources they could mobilize, and many other fac-
tors. Hopefully fresh progresses could be made. This improvement would be a great part of the 
national-wide program to upgrade Chinese economy.
7. Conclusion
Stock market, as an importation from Western Capitalist countries, is a mixed product in 
China. Currently it’s not insignificantly related to Chinese real economy, nor does it add credits 
to Chinese capital market. A fundamental improvement of stock market is not likely in forese-
eable future due to the special situations of China, however there are other means to enhance the 
capital market, such as to improve the banking sector or to develop flexible, targeted mechanisms 
for funding. Therefore stock market is not the best option to enhance capital market for China.
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